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WALLED GARDENS OF PRIVACY OR "B[NDING CORPORATE




Protecting Internet users' privacy is a growing concern in the era of
cloud computing, especially when one considers the absence of any effec-
tive international solutions. The existing Safe Harbor Privacy Principles,
which were meant to guarantee stringent European Union (EU) data protec-
tion standards for U.S. companies, are ineffective. In order to protect the
privacy of Internet users, the existing trans-Atlantic personal data exchange
agreements need to be amended. This article presents the latest EU-proposed
development in the area-a regulatory model based on amended Binding
Corporate Rules ("BCR" or "BCRs")-as introduced by EU Justice Com-
missioner Reding in late 2011. The 2012 reform of EU data protection regu-
lations includes proposals to modify the EU approach to corporate personal
data protection policies and to simplify regulations for companies participat-
ing in the EU market. The planned changes in EU legislation would have
worldwide effects on international companies' online activities in trans-
boundary cyberspace.
After describing the BCR proposal, this article will consider the likeli-
hood of both its application as well as alternative scenarios to the EU-
proposed model. The most likely alternative depicts a gloomy vision of
loosely intertwined, firewall-guarded national areas in cyberspace where
privacy would be secured according to varying national standards-a
"splinternet" operating on elaborate software and stringent legislation. Such
national "walled gardens" of privacy would well resemble the current trends
in national cybersecurity policies, where an increasing number of states are
opting to limit their residents' access to the global network with elaborate
software and legislation. This pessimistic scenario would mean the end of
the global information society, whose bastion of liberty is the boundless
cyberspace. This article offers an international-law solution to this challenge
and emphasizes the significance of the BCR's proposal.
* Assistant Professor, Department of International Law and International Relations,
Faculty of Law and Administration, University of Lodz, Poland.
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II. BACKGROUND
Defining privacy has always been a challenge, not only when it comes
to identifying its scope, but also when one attempts to portray its origins. In
U.S. jurisprudence, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis are hailed by most
scholars as authors of the "right to be let alone" concept, which introduced
the notion of privacy in the late nineteenth century.1 Around the same time
in Germany, Josef Kohler discussed a similar concept.2 However, French
courts are credited with recognizing the right to private life as early as the
mid-nineteenth century.3
Initially taken with much skepticism,4 the idea of legal protection for
one's private life developed and found its undisputed place in international
jurisprudence.' Although the right to privacy is no longer questioned, a defi-
nition of privacy, vital for ascertaining the scope of appropriate legal protec-
tion, is still hard to find. The reasons for this predicament are twofold.
The first challenge is the disaccord on the actual nature of the term.
Privacy is directly related to human rights and personal data protection in
Europe, while in the United States and numerous other jurisdictions, it is
perceived as an element of commercial enterprise.6 Even when these two
different understandings of privacy meet in the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) forum, and it is assumed that per-
sonal data is a component of the individual's right to privacy, the ways and
means in which to protect that right strongly differ. Unavoidably, this disac-
1. See, e.g., Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis
Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 327 (1966); Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren
and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appropriation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 647 (1991).
But see David W. Leebron, The Right to Privacy's Place in the Intellectual History of Tort
Law, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 775-77 (1991) (accrediting E. L. Godkin with formulat-
ing the need of protection of privacy in E. L. Godkin, Libel and Its Legal Remedy, 12 J. Soc.
ScI. 69 (1880)).
2. Josef Kohler, Ehre und Beleidigung, 47 GOLTDAMMERS ARCHIV FOR DT.
STRAFRECHT 1-48 (1900); see Ulrich Falk & Heinz Mohnhaupt, Das Bargerliche Gesetzbuch
und seine Richter: zur Reaktion der Rechtsprechung auf die Kodifikation des deutschen
Privatrechts (1896-1914), 359-60 (2000).
3. ANDRE BERTRAND, DROIT A LA VIE PRIVEE ET DROIT A L'IMAGE 2 (1999). For a
comprehensive study on the genesis of privacy see ARWIND MEDNIS, PRAWO DO PRYWATNSCI
A INTERES PUBLICZNY 58 (2006).
4. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
5. See Erwin N. Griswold, The Right to be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 216, 218-20
(1961).
6. See COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACTY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC
POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 45-94 (1992); David L. Baumer, Julia B. Earp &
J.C. Poindexter, Internet Privacy Law: A Comparison Between the United States and the
European Union, 5 COMPUTERS & SEC. 400, 400-12 (2004) (comparing the EU data
protection regime and the California Online Privacy Protection Act of 2003).
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cord renders ineffective any legal tools introduced to protect this perceived
privacy globally.
The second challenge stems from the shifting scope of privacy. In Eu-
ropean jurisprudence, the term has been comprehensively defined through
the application of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms ("The European Convention on Human Rights" or
"ECHR") and might seem consistently understood throughout all forty-
seven ECHR state parties. The challenges brought about by the era of cyber-
space make this pillar of human rights tremble. New challenges to the seem-
ingly well-defined scope of the term are brought about by services such as
Google Street View and new categories of personal information like
geolocalization data enabled through mobile devices.7 It is unclear whether
the right to have one's home portrayed and identified online to all users
worldwide or to have information of one's real-time location enabled to
mobile phone operators, Internet service providers, or Internet users should
be recognized as elements of the right to have one's privacy protected and,
therefore, secured with additional legal safeguards. Adding to these ques-
tions are the difficult issues of online jurisdiction over Internet service pro-
viders (ISPs) or Internet content providers (ICPs). Whether national courts
and authorities, such as data protection ombudsmen, have jurisdiction over,
for instance, Facebook's geolocalization data of its users within its Places
service or over Google photographing local streets for its Google Street
View is defined differently by national courts.8 Durability, accessibility, and
other unique characteristics of electronic data induce new proposals for
complementing the right to privacy with, for example, a right to be forgot-
ten 9 or automated data deletion after a certain, arbitrarily set period of
time. 10
7. See EUR. PARL. Ass., The Protection of Privacy and Personal Data on the Internet
and Online Media, 36th Sess., Res. No. 1843 (2011), available at
http://assembly.coe.int/Mainf.asp?link-/Documents/AdoptedText/tal 1/ERES 1 843.htm.
8. German courts have jurisdiction over Google Street View filming Berlin streets. See
Cyrus Farivar, Berlin Court Rules Google Street View is Legal in Germany, DEUTSCHE
WELLE (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/O,,14929074,00.html. While the
Polish Personal Data Ombudsman is equally certain, Polish courts have no jurisdiction over
Facebook, even though it offers its services in Poland. See Facebook poza Polskq
Jurysdykcjq: Nie Moina go ani Pozwa6, ani Skontrolowa4 [Facebook Outside Polish
Jurisdiction: Cannot be Sued or Controlled], GAZETA PRAWNA (Nov. 19, 2010),
http://prawo.gazetaprawna.plartykuly/466155,facebookjpozapolskajurysdykcja nie-mozn
a_goani_pozwac ani skontrolowac.html.
9. EU Proposes 'Right to be Forgotten' by Internet Firms, BBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology- 16677370.
10. See generally VIKTOR MAYTER-SCHONBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING
IN THE DIGITAL AGE 169-98 (2011).
20121
UALR LAW REVIEW
When attempting to define privacy, legal scholars and practitioners
alike traditionally resort to one of three sets of norms. The most frequently
used set of norms for resolving privacy issues are regulations on personal
data protection. In the event these are insufficient, civil law offers protection
of personal rights, which includes privacy. Should those two categories of
legal safeguards not suffice, the constitutional right to privacy, understood
in categories of human rights, may be evoked."
A. Privacy as a Human Right
Privacy as a human right is firmly rooted in the ECHR and is recog-
nized in the constitutions and other legal acts of member states.'2 ECHR
jurisprudence recognizes the right to privacy in its Article 8 as a derivative
of the right to have one's private and family life respected. 3 As such, the
human right to privacy may be restricted only in certain cases detailed by
the ECHR.14 The 1953 ECHR (drafted in 1950) was one of the sources used
for creating the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of
the United Nations (ICCPR), which in its Article 17 expressly protects pri-
vacy. 15 The stipulation of Article 17 resulted in similar provisions adopted in
numerous constitutions and other national privacy regulations. The adoption
of these provisions may be regarded as the verbalization of a bottom-line
consensus on the existence and characteristics of the universal right to pri-
vacy that is understood as a human right.
When seeking the most suitable legal tool for personal privacy protec-
tion, one should analyze the international regulation of personal data protec-
tion. Various soft-law documents from multiple international forums, most
significantly the OECD, reveal the universal accord of those international
regulations. The non-binding yet influential 1980 OECD Guidelines on the
11. See, e.g., Flemming Moos & Jens Kirchner, Data Protection and Monitoring, in
KEY ASPECTS OF GERMAN EMPLOYMENT AND LABOUR LAW 109 (Jens Kirchner et al eds.,
2009) (finding a "personal right" to data privacy as an employee). See also Kay Deaux &
Brenda Major, A Social-Psychological Model of Gender, in THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON
SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 89 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990).
12. See, e.g., ALBERT J. MARCELLA & CAROL STUCKI, PRIVACY HANDBOOK: GUIDELINES,
EXPOSURES, POLICY IMPLEMENTATION, AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUES 118 (2003) (referring to
such a legal construction introduced in Slovenia).
13. See URSULA KILKELLY, THE RIGHT TO RESPECT FOR PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE: A
GUIDE TO THE IMPLEMENTAITON OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 10-19, 34-65 (2d ed. 2003).
14. Id. at 23-33 (discussing the application of Article 8 para. 2 of the ECHR, devoted to
instances when privacy rights may be restricted).
15. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 ("No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his priva-
cy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation ....
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.").
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Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flow of Personal Data ("Guidelines")
are an early example of a global consensus on the protection of personal
data. The Guidelines express a basic compromise on privacy as a human
right. 6 That right is protected through scrupulous administration of personal
data exercised by the administrator, prohibiting personal data retention (in-
cluding the retention of false personal data), data abuse, and unauthorized
disclosure. Interestingly, the Guidelines served as early foundations for nu-
merous national regulations on privacy in places such as Australia, Canada,
and Hong Kong. '" In 1998, the OECD Ministerial Declaration on the Protec-
tion of Privacy on Global Networks supplemented the Guidelines' stipula-
tions. "
B. Privacy and Personal Data
Presently, the most rigorous regulations on personal data protection
implemented in Europe are introduced as either acts of EU law or ECHR
enforcement.' 9 In attempting to identify principles reflected in both EU law
and ECHR decisions, one should begin by examining the 1981 Council of
Europe (CoE) Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data.20 The Convention was aimed at
strengthening "the legal protection of individuals with regard to automatic
processing of personal information relating to him.",2' It obligates states to
guarantee that data operators maintain the quality of information in their
possession, refrain from storing operationally unnecessary information, and
guard personal data against unauthorized disclosure or misuse.
22
The EU envisaged similar principles in 1995 when it introduced Di-
rective 95/46/EC ("Directive") on the protection of individuals with regard
16. OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal
Data, ORGANISATION FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. (Sept. 23, 1980),
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_34255 1815186 1 1 1 1,00.html (last
visited June 1, 2012).
17. See CATHERINE L. MANN, TRANSATLANTIC ISSUES IN ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 18
(2000).
18. OECD Party on Information Security and Privacy, Ministerial Declaration on the
Protection of Privacy on Global Networks (Oct. 7-9, 1998), http://www.oecd.org
/dataoecd/39/13/1840065.pdf.
19. See CHRISTOPHER KUNER, EUROPEAN DATA PRIVACY LAW AND ONLINE BUSINESS 1-
49 (2003).
20. Convention for the Protection of individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of
Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, Europ. T.S. No. 108, available at http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/en /Treaties/html/108.htm (last visited May 28, 2012) [hereinafter Convention].




to the processing of personal data and the free movement of such data.3 The
Directive is considered the groundwork for the EU's personal data protec-
tion. The Directive defines personal data by setting the limits of the legally-
protected, individual right to privacy using personal data protection terms.
According to Article 2 of the Directive, "personal data" is any information
"relating to an identified or identifiable natural person. '24 An "identifiable
person" is defined by Article 2 as "a person who can be identified, directly
or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one
or more factors specific to his [or her] physical, physiological, mental, eco-
nomic, cultural[,] or social identity., 25 The mechanism for privacy protec-
tion is based upon the Directive's data processing guidelines. Data-
processing guidelines encompass various activities and regulate those con-
ducting the processing. 26 According to Article 6, member states must ensure
that data processors process personal data fairly and lawfully and only col-
lect such data for specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes. If personal
data is processed, it should be done adequately, relevantly, and not exces-
sively in relation to the purposes for which it was collected. Processed per-
sonal data ought to be accurate and kept up to date otherwise it should be
erased or rectified. The basic principle of personal data administration obli-
gates data processors to keep personal data in a form that permits identifica-
tion of data subjects but only for as long as it is necessary. 27 Because those
23. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on
the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L: 1995:281:0031:0050:EN:PDF [hereinaf-
ter Directive 95/46/EC] (amended by Regulation (EC) No. 1882/2003 of the European Par-




26. According to Article 2, "processing of personal data. . . mean[s] any operation ...
performed upon personal data,... such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adap-
tation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or
otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
27. The scope of privacy protection guaranteed under the provisions of Directive
95/46/EC may be substantially altered by the controversial "data retention" Directive
2006/24/EC. Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15
March 2006 on the Retention of Data Generated or Processed in Connection with the Provi-
sion of Publicly Available Electronic Communications Services or of Public Communica-
tions Networks and Amending Directive 2002/58/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 105) 54, available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32006L0024:en:HTML. A
practical result of introducing the regulation is that European ISPs are required to retain "traf-
fic data" (data generated automatically during the performance of network services) about
their users (data retention). The official purpose of the regulation is to facilitate the work of
enforcement authorities and prevent crimes specified in the laws of each member state. The
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principles are enshrined within the Directive, member states should take
proper measures to enforce the goal set within the Directive through appro-
priate, domestic legal tools.
The Directive introduces a particularly high standard of care for cate-
gories of personal data that are crucial to protecting individual privacy. Pro-
cessing special data, such as information about racial or ethnic origin, politi-
cal opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union membership,
health, or sex life is generally prohibited but can take place upon individual
consent given by the data subject.28
Subsequently, EU states adopted fitting national legislation following
the Directive's definitions and procedures. In fact, many non-EU states also
adopted similar models.2 9 In order to face contemporary challenges to per-
sonal data protection, the EU Community instituted the Working Party on
the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data
under Article 29 of the Directive (WG29) with the purpose of addressing the
issues vital to personal data protection as defined within the Directive.30
While the scope and definition of personal data protection may be well
defined in Europe, the definition of privacy is not nearly as clear. Neither
EU law, nor ECHR jurisprudence attempts to recognize privacy as a set of
individual prerogatives. The EU recognizes the right to privacy in Articles 7
and 8 of its Charter of Fundamental Rights,31 but European jurisprudence
still treats privacy questions as an extremely fact intensive process, often
producing what appears to be conflicting results. The minimum standard set
by the courts could be defined as "a right to establish and develop relation-
Directive was met with vigorous objection from European human rights organizations as well
as negative opinions of national constitutional tribunals, finding it a gross violation of the
constitutional right to privacy. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitu-
tional Court] Mar. 2, 2010, ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS
[BVERFGE] 08, 256, 263, 586 (holding the obligation imposed by the Directive 2006/24/EC
unconstitutional in the light of Article 10 of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz) (Ger.)).
An earlier similar decision was issued by the Romanian Constitutional Court: Curtii
Constitutionale [Constitutional Court] Oct. 8, 2009, MONITORUL OFICIAL Nov. 23, 2009
(Rom.), available at http://www.ccr.ro/decisions/pdf/ro/ 2009/D 1258_09.pdf, translated at
http ://www.legi-internet.ro/english/jurisprudenta-it-romania/decizii-it/romanian-
constitutional-court-decision-regarding-data-retention.html.
28. Article 8 paragraph 2 lists other exceptions from the prohibition on processing sensi-
tive data and includes processing necessary data in employment law, the protection of vital
interests of the data subject, or processing data that is manifestly made public by the data
subject. Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 23, at 40-41.
29. See Michael D. Bimhack, The EU Data Protection Directive: An Engine of a Global
Regime, 24 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REP. 508, 512-13 (2008).
30. Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 23, at 48 (working party website available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/workinggroup/indexen.htm).
31. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, O.J. (C 364/1).
2012]
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ship with other human beings. 32 When states aim to limit the privacy of
individuals, guaranteed by Article 8 of the ECHR, they may introduce re-
strictions through legislation and only when it is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and free-
doms of others.33 In case of controversies, the European Court of Human
Rights assesses whether such individual restriction was "necessary in a
democratic society" and proportional. Ultimately, no general definition or
standard for privacy exists.34
C. Privacy as a Personal Right
Privacy protection, as designed by data protection regulations and in-
ternational human rights treaties, applies only to situations where individual
privacy is threatened by government action or omission.35 If private actors
threaten privacy protection, the civil law protection of personal rights is
often invoked to settle the dispute.36 German-language countries originated
civil law doctrine, which, when referring to privacy protection, refers to the
theory of spheres. 37 Both German and Swiss civil law theory and practice
recognize public, private, and intimate spheres, and each sphere is afforded
a different degree of protection." Any activity of an individual and any in-
formation about them can qualify as falling within either his or her public
(Sozial- / Offentlichkeitssphare), private (Privatsphdre), or intimate
(Intimsphdire) sphere and is awarded protection accordingly." Activities that
32. See SELECT COMMITEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, SURVEILLANCE: CITIZENS AND THE
STATE, 2008-9, H. L.18-1, 123 (U.K.).
33. Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 23, at 42.
34. KILKELLY, supra note 13, at 10-19, 34-65.
35. Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 23, at 39 ("This Directive shall not apply to the
processing of personal data . . .by a natural person in the course of a purely personal or
household activity."). The scope of "personal activity" in the online environment is particu-
larly difficult to assess. See, e.g., Michael D. Bimhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, Does Law Mat-
ter Online? Empirical Evidence on Privacy Law Compliance, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH.
L. REV. 337,380-82 (2011).
36. Although following the interpretation of Article 8, the Court imposes a positive
obligation on state parties to introduce appropriate tools within national legal systems for
effective protection of privacy from threats originating from actions or omissions of private
individuals. See, e.g., K.U. v. Fin., 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, para. 42-43, at 12.
37. See, e.g., JOHANNES M. HOLZ, GOOGLE STREET VIEW - WIE DETAILLIERT DARF EIN
STADTPLAN SEIN? 12-14; HELMUT KOZIOL, PERSONLICHKEITSSCHUTZ GEGENOBER
MASSENMEDIEN 548 (2005); HEIKE SCHAFFRIN, ALLGEMEINES PERSONLICHKEITSRECHT:
HAFTUNG FUR DIE VERLETZUNG DES PERSONLICHKEITSRECHTS DURCH KUNST 3-6 (2010).
38. SCHAFFRIN, supra note 37, at 3-6.
39. Id.
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fall within the intimate sphere are given the strongest protection, while ac-
tivities in the public sphere receive virtually no protection.4"
When attempting to describe each of the three categories, one could
characterize activities within the public sphere as those performed by an
individual following their public duties and obligations, such as exercising a
public function or a profession. Such activities would not fall within the
ambit of privacy protection. All activities or information outside this scope
are shielded by privacy protection because the activities could not be identi-
fied as falling within the public sphere. A decision to give up such protec-
tion and release private information is left to the individual, although some
information within this group is given stronger protection. Any activity from
the intimate sphere or information thereabout is given strenuous protection
and in some cases is not revealed or used even if the person consents. This
highest degree of protection is awarded to information on, for instance, sex-
ual identity or religious beliefs. Civil law offers no definition of "intimacy";
however, the contents of the intimate sphere may be well defined by a refer-
ence to the set of "sensitive data" given particular protection under the Di-
rective 95/46/EC.'" The civil law protection given to all personal rights al-
lows individuals whose privacy is threatened to demand that the potential
infringement be seized (for example, infringing information is deleted or a
press release is stopped), while those who already suffered infringement and
harm may demand pecuniary compensation or damages.42 Although the
concept seems appealing in theory, its practical application is always chal-
lenging because there is no consensus about the scope of activities within
each sphere.
D. Privacy Challenges
This brief definition of the continental concept of privacy and its pro-
tections seems to fit well with the original idea articulated by Samuel War-
ren and Louis Brandeis, which guaranteed individuals their "right to be let
alone."43 Twentieth century European definitions of privacy presented for
research or policy purposes seem to have a similar tone. For example, upon
presenting its 1900 report on Privacy and Related Matters to the House of
Lords, the British Parliamentary Calcutt Committee members defined priva-
40. Id.
41. See generally Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 23.
42. Cf, e.g., GUNTHER ARZT, DER STRAFRECHTLICHE SCHUTZ DER INTiMSPHARE 101
(J.C.B. Mohr et al. eds., 1970) (providing more detailed distinctions); UDO BRANAHL,
MEDIENRECHT: EINE EiNFORUNG 135 (2009) (distinguishing the social sphere (Sozialsphaere)
and secret sphere (Sekretsphaere)).




cy as "[t]he right of the individual to be protected against intrusion into his
personal life or affairs or those of his family, by direct physical means or by
publication of information."" However, this superficial conformity is mis-
leading because European and common law privacy protection systems dif-
fer significantly. The European and U.S. concepts of privacy originated
from similar sources in the late nineteenth century but evolved along two
very different paths.
Placing the right to privacy in the ambit of ECHR or the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights clearly defined it as a human right, and personal data is
considered its primary designation. At the same time, in U.S. doctrine, per-
sonal data is perceived primarily as a commercial commodity. This percep-
tion is reflected by a strong and rapidly evolving personal data market.
There is no uniform federal privacy regulation in the U.S because the gov-
ernment considers it an obstacle to developing free trade and e-commerce.45
Introducing federal privacy regulations would also be too complex consider-
ing the U.S. constitutional regime and the delegation of authority to the
states. A unique model regulation developed with the help of the United
States Department of Commerce guarantees the protection of few individual
rights.46 The document is aimed at aiding the market self-regulation by es-
tablishing a uniform standard for the protection of personal data. It is, there-
fore, quite different from the European model, which requires governments
to take an active role in protecting state residents' privacy.4 7
The inconsistency in privacy perception around the world prompted lit-
tle controversy until the era of cyberspace. With massive online interactions
and personal data retention and exchange, the two different legal concepts of
protecting privacy collided, and the need for their harmonization arose. A
critical factor for the shape of this globalization was the demanding EU reg-
ulation on personal data protection. The stipulations of Article 25 of the EU
Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of personal data enforced compliance
44. COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY AND RELATED MATTERS, REPORT, 1990, H.L. at 7 (U.K.).
45. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PRIVACY AND COMPUTER CRIME COMMITTEE SECTION
OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY LAW, INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO PRIVACY 94-95 (Jody R. Westby
ed., 2004).
46. See the Safe Harbor Principles discussed infra Part III.E.
47. See K.U. v. Fin., 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, para. 42-43 at 12.
[A]lthough the object of Article 8 is essentially to protect the individual against
arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not merely compel the
State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this primarily negative un-
dertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for
private or family life. . . . These obligations may involve the adoption of
measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the rela-
tions of individuals between themselves .... [T]he nature of the State's obliga-
tion will depend on the particular aspect of private life that is at issue.
Id. (citations omitted).
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of all entities collecting, transferring, or processing data protected under the
Directive, regardless of their location with the European personal data pro-
tection guarantees.4 8 Article 25 obligates EU member states to transmit data
to any state if that state ensures an equal level of personal data security.49
Therefore, if any non-EU state wishes for its companies or individuals to
obtain access to personal data protected under the EU Directive, it would
have to guarantee that the data would be protected in compliance with the
Directive.
Meeting that challenge proved difficult, especially for the transatlantic
flow of personal data. Given the vast divergence between the European and
U.S. perceptions of privacy protection, a suitable compromise was difficult
to find. A substitute for such a satisfactory compromise was a solution root-
ed more in business ethics and good practice than statutory law. In order to
enable personal data to transfer from Europe to the U.S., the Department of
Commerce (DoC) coordinated the formulation of Safe Harbor Privacy Prin-
ciples. United States entrepreneurs wishing to use personal data protected by
the EU law must accept the Principles (an undertaking coordinated by the
U.S. DoC). United States entrepreneurs also need to repeatedly certify that
they meet the aims declared in the Principles by joining one of the self-
regulating programs; for example, TRUSTe or BBBOnline verify compli-
ance with the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles.5"
III. SAFE HARBOR PRIVACY PRINCIPLES
Following consultations with the EU representatives, the U.S. DoC de-
veloped a set of guidelines that satisfied the European data protection re-
quirements.5 Any U.S. company wishing to use personal data protected
under the Directive must adhere to the guiding principles of the Directive, as
reflected in the Safe Harbor documents.52 The declaration of each company
48. Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 23, at 45-46.
49. Id.
50. See Henry Farrell, Negotiating Privacy Across Arenas: The EU-US "Safe Harbor
Discussions, " in COMMON GOODS: REINVENTING EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE 105-25 (Adrienne Hdritier ed., 2002). Additional information about the Safe
Harbor Principles is available at www.export.gov/safeharbor.asp.
51. See Decision 2000/520, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 July
2000 on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided by the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles and
Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce, 2000 O.J.
(L 215) 7.
52. Id. It must be noted that not all categories of data may be transferred under the
agreement (health or insurance information are excluded from the regulation). Id.
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to adhere to the program includes an obligation to meet the seven basic aims
of the Directive.53
Safe Harbor Privacy Principles are not an act of law. Their only legal
effect is to encourage voluntary corporate compliance with the Principles
verified by authorized organizations. Violations of the Principles are
deemed acts of unfair or deceptive trade practice by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC). 4 In addition, U.S.-based companies operating in Eu-
rope may be subject to European states' jurisdiction if they fail to meet their
data protection obligations based on national personal data regulations.
The execution and enforcement of Safe Harbor Privacy Principles has
been subject to criticism, primarily because of the lack of transparency on
the introduction and verification of privacy policies.55 The 2004 EU review
of the implementation of the Principles included repeated concern "about
the number of self-certified organizations that have not published a privacy
policy or that have published a policy that is not compliant with the Princi-
ples."56 The crucial, practical problem originated from the voluntary charac-
ter of the guidelines. Since some companies did not introduce any privacy
policy, the FTC had no jurisdiction to enforce their compliance with the
Principles.57 The Commission also depicted the lack of a proactive attitude
in monitoring organizations' compliance with the Principles.58 An inde-
pendent 2008 review showed a growing number of false claims by U.S. or-
ganizations on their Safe Harbor compliance and recognized it as a new and
significant threat to consumers' privacy. 59 That assessment remains true
despite the recent demonstration of FTC authority over Facebook privacy
policies that do not conform to the Principles.6" The 2008 Connolly recom-
mendation for the EU to promptly take "a more 'hands-on' approach" in
executing European personal data protection laws abroad was swiftly put
53. Id. at Annex 1. These aims include: notice, choice, onward transfer, security, data
integrity, access, and enforcement. Id.
54. Id. (in some cases - Department of Transportation).
55. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Working Document on Functioning of the
Safe Harbor Agreement, 11194/02/EN, WP 62 (July 2, 2002), available at http://ec.europa.eu
/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2002/wp62 en.pdf.
56. Commission Staff Working Document on the Implementation of Commission Deci-
sion 520/2000/EC on the Adequate Protection of Personal Data Provided by the Safe Harbor
Privacy Principles and Related Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the US Department of
Commerce, at 13, (SEC 2004) 1323 (Oct. 20, 2004).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Chris Connolly, US Safe Harbor - Fact or Fiction?, 96 PRIVACY Ls. & Bus. INT'L 1,
16(2008).
60. Facebook Settles Privacy Case with US Regulators, BBC NEWS (Nov. 29, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business- 15953414.
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into practice in the form of a BCR-based proposal by EU Justice Commis-
sioner Reding in 2011.61
IV. BINDING CORPORATE RULES
Responding to growing criticism of the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles
execution and the rising threat to European citizens' privacy from online
media, EU Justice Commissioner Reding formulated a bold proposal aimed
at simultaneously solving both of these problems. In a November 201 1
speech, Reding proposed that BCR company codes of practice based on EU
data protection standards were the "efficient and effective tools" to properly
protect personal information online.62
Binding corporate rules, although unpopular, are a well-known practice
among European entrepreneurs since their practical application proved cost-
ly and burdensome. Those vices preordained the BCR to have a minimal
impact on transboundary privacy protection. However, Reding wishes to
make them the basis for an amended, legally binding EU proposal governing
transnational cooperation on the human right to privacy.63 Such a proposal
would replace the current, non-functioning trans-Atlantic approach.64
Although not originating directly from the Directive, the support of
WG29 has encouraged the development of BCRs. 65 BCRs are sets of good
business practice guidelines adopted by companies voluntarily and applied
throughout their branches, regardless of where the branches are located.66
BCRs and safe harbor agreement declarations differ. Although companies
are not legally obligated to adopt BCRs, the rules become legally binding
once they are adopted.67 BCRs become legally binding on companies once
approved by one of the twenty-seven national data protection authorities
(each for one EU Member State). 68 As Commissioner Reding explained,
what follows is an agreement "consciously made" by an EU company to
make certain actions vis-A-vis personal data either required or prohibited.69
61. Connolly, supra note 59, at 16.
62. Viviane Reding, Vice President of the European Comm'n & EU Justice Comm'r,
Address at the IAPP Europe Data Protection Congress in Paris: Binding Corporate Rules:













The real problem is that approval from one national data protection commis-
sioner is not binding on other national data ombudsmen, leaving a company
to struggle through difficult and costly international administrative proce-
dures.7" Therefore, BCRs are a functional, binding legal tool to prevent pri-
vacy invasions and personal data exploitations, not only within EU states'
territories, but also worldwide.71 In her address, Reding proposed a solution,
by simplifying BCR procedures and encouraging consistency in enforce-
ment and innovation.72 The simplification of the current BCR scheme would
result in its unilateral verification-that is, a set of rules recognized by one
national data protection authority that would be automatically recognized in
other EU states.73 To simplify enforcement of the BCRs, Reding proposed
strengthening the powers of national data protection authorities to permit
prosecution of breaches of data protection laws reflected in the BCRs (with
respect to actions within companies as well as third parties).74 Effective
globalization of BCRs would endeavor to show the transnational character-
istic of cyberspace in evaluating personal data protection mechanisms.75
Reding proposes "push[ing] the boundaries of traditional regulatory models"
through innovation, not in a technological sense, but rather in a legislative
and administrative one.76 While recognizing that the obstructing EU bureau-
cracy discourages business from applying the most stringent data protection
regulations, the current BCR proposal includes a simplification of adminis-
trative procedures for companies that introduce those binding data protec-
tion policies.77 In this sense, innovation means reconsidering the signifi-
cance of territorial borders in territorial cyberspace. BCRs apply "to all in-
ternal and extra-EU transfers of any entity in a group of companies," freeing
the enterprise from the obligation to secure approval of the company rules in
each country separately.78 Reding promised the shift would allow companies
to operate based on "just one single document that governs the privacy poli-
cy of the whole group instead of a variety of different, and not always con-
sistent, contracts. 79
This innovation is also to be achieved through a revolution in EU data
protection. As announced on January 23, 2012, the EU data protection di-











80. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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legislative instruments is of tremendous importance. While an EU directive
obligates each member state to introduce national legislation aimed at meet-
ing a particular goal as it is defined within the directive, a regulation is ap-
plied directly in national legal systems. 81 A data protection regulation would
give companies one set of rules to follow regardless of territorial boundaries
and would give national data protection bodies the very same system of le-
gal rules to apply to every BCR assessmentY With the help of WG29 to
interpret the prospective regulation and a long-standing privacy protection
policy, the prospective shift seems very promising.
The proposal has been met with approval from EU companies and na-
tional governments alike. Some states welcomed the changes with coherent,
national BCR administrative procedures in place.83 Anticipating the new
procedures, cooperating Danish and Swedish data protection authorities
introduced a bilateral formula for approving BCRs in October 2011 and
initially applied it to a regional healthcare provider, Novo Nordisk.84 Similar
endeavors may serve as a platform for further harmonization work of
WG29.85
Reding's idea was designed to be transnational. It is an answer to the
challenge of cloud computing across national borders and reflects the specif-
ics of cyberspace. She openly claimed that the BCRs are "open to go beyond
the geographical borders of Europe." 86 Should the plans become reality,
Europe's leading role in shaping international privacy policy would be en-
hanced. However, if the bold plan of uniting the global cloud computing
market under a joint set of privacy principles of European design fails, what
other option could be considered? The most viable alternative is presented
below.
V. "WALLED GARDENS" OF PRIVACY
If privacy regulation were left to individual states with no uniform,
global standard in place, the internet would slowly devolve from its transna-
tional nature and eventually lose its global character. Building walls in cy-
berspace is difficult but as the Chinese experience shows, not impossible.87
81. Id.
82. Treaty on European Union, July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191).




86. Reding, supra note 62.
87. The actual efficiency of the Great Firewall of China is often criticized. See, e.g.,
Richard Clayton, Steven J. Murdoch & Robert N. M. Watson, Ignoring the Great Firewall of
China (June 27, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (presented at the Sixth Workshop on Privacy
Enhancing Technology, Cambridge University), available at
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Apparently encouraged by China's success in delimiting "the Chinese cy-
berspace" with the Great Firewall of China, the EU considered the electron-
ic Schengen zone in 2011, the very same year Australia introduced plans to
block illegal content away from its "virtual territory."88 Just recently the
U.S. considered closing "U.S. cyberspace" to prevent copyright violations
with the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the PROTECT IP Act (PIPA).
The U.S. is still considering securing "the U.S. cyberspace," as if raising
national borders in cyberspace was a natural consequence of state sovereign-
ty.
8 9
"Internet filtering" is a term used to describe the national practice of
disabling access to certain online content that is deemed harmful by state
authorities and is usually recognized as illegal by national laws.9" Filtering
policies are often criticized for a number of reasons. Internet censorship
primarily limits the citizens' right to receive information. It also creates a
danger of particularization of the global network into smaller, national, well-
filtered systems where only some of the global content is available-only as
much of it as national laws allow. The vision of an effectively and exten-
sively filtered Internet is sometimes pejoratively referred to as "splintemet,"
a term depicting the loss of the universality of the network (an Internet
"splintered" into separate local webs).91
Typically used to control state residents' access to certain data and re-
strain their right to free speech (which includes the right to receive and im-
part information), Internet filtering may also be viewed as a limitation on
individual rights, particularly the right to privacy. The EU, an organization
now proposing a global solution for privacy protection, considered closing
its electronic networks to non-EU entrepreneurs with the use of electronic
gates in 2011.92 With the "virtual Schengen border" in place, all electronic
content entering the "European cyberspace" is scanned for legality and al-
lowed access only if it meets European legal standards. 93 The idea never
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/-rncl/ignoring.pdf.
88. See, e.g., Jan Lewifiski, UE chcialaby mie6 internet jak w Chinach, DZIENNIKI
INTERNAUTrW,
http://di.com.plnews/38097,0,Opinie UE chcialabymiecinternetjak-wChinach.html
(last visited Aug. 6, 2012).
89. See, e.g., Chris C. Demchak & Peter Dombrowski, Rise of a Cybered Westphalian
Age, 5 STRATEGIC STUDIES QUARTERLY 32 (Spring 2011).
90. See, e.g., Clayton et al., supra note 87, at 22, 33.
91. The Future of the Internet, a Virtual Counter-Revolution, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 2,
2010), http://www.economist .com/node/16941635.
92. Jennifer Baker, European Legislators Consider Net Filter for Europe, COMPUTER
WORLD (May 3, 2011), www.computerworld.com.au/article/384993/european legislators_
consider net filter europ/.
93. Id.
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made it into a legal bill, primarily due to devastating criticism that it was not
only undemocratic but also unrealistic.94
This idea should be reconsidered in the context of privacy protection
because a splinternet seems to be the only alternative to a globalized privacy
policy. The EU is unlikely to stray from its stringent personal data protec-
tion regulations. If the BCR proposal does not meet international support,
the EU will continue its attempts to effectively protect its residents' privacy.
Should it find no international accord on the subject of privacy (one that is
divergently comprehended in national legal systems), the EU may eventual-
ly resort to the introduction of software-based tools to enforce compliance
with its rules. Therefore, a privacy based splinternet seems to be a viable
option. Moreover, electronic barriers erected for purposes other than privacy
protection, such as cybersecurity or copyright protection, could serve as
effective safeguards. The EU may resort to building a "walled garden," se-
cured with electronic firewalls-essentially an electronic version of the
Schengen agreement. Electronic data would be checked and allowed out of
the EU-based electronic infrastructure only if EU laws, including privacy
requirements, were followed.95
VI. DISCUSSION
BCRs are more effective than privacy protection enforced through
electronic walls because they preserve the global character of the network.
Perceived through national or regional standards, electronic walls construct-
ed to preserve privacy make the threat of a splinternet real. Regardless of
whether it is introduced to protect privacy, prevent copyright infringement,
or uphold morality, splinternet signals the end of the global network as we
know it. The global information society will cease to exist if the once-global
network becomes a set of sparsely connected national webs. Nations may
gain the perception of security but lose the interoperability of the global
network and access to the global "cloud" of information. If states choose to
sacrifice their residents' freedom of information and exercise permanent
surveillance of all online activities in order to guarantee security and secure
data through national privacy standards, a global cyberspace that posed the
initial threat will be gone.
A walled cyberspace does not have to be the answer. International law
offers several potential solutions to these global challenges, grounded in its
94. Id. The inefficiencies and high costs of the Chinese system were the primary argu-
ments against it. Id.
95. The practical application of such a scenario is feasible from a legislative point of
view; at the same time however, the strong economic ties of European companies with their
non-European counterparts make it a final resort.
20121
UALR LAW REVIEW
rich jurisprudence on human rights and conflict resolution. There are nu-
merous international projects aimed at reaching a consensus in the applica-
tion of existing human rights for online interactions-for example, the
OECD Guidelines on personal data.96
The more recent developments in privacy protection compromise are
geared toward the structure of the cloud-computing based cyberspace.9 7 Da-
ta protection policies are no longer settled at governmental conferences but,
instead, are established by transnational companies. These data protection
policies are verified by the users who either willing use them or exit a net-
work they find to be unsafe or exploitive. Global businesses were the first to
recognize the characteristics of the information society and amend their pol-
icy models accordingly. Because elaborate international hard-law treaties
are time-consuming and require extensive compromises, current proposals
resort to soft-law measures. These soft-law measures take the form of self-
regulation (or co-regulation)98 based on common ethical standards, de-
scribed in non-binding declarations or guiding principles. Endeavors such as
the Google Global Network Initiative99 resort to self-regulation, calling upon
industry representatives (social platforms operators, ISPs) to adhere to a set
of rules and principles aimed at granting international privacy protection to
their users. " The existing privacy challenge encourages companies to reach
for the rich, soft-law background available in public international law.
Commissioner Reding's proposal takes this practice a step further, giving a
company-proposed set of policy guidelines a legally binding character after
its approval by an EU data protection body. Introducing the BCRs might
serve as the missing link between soft law regulations and international law
making. The role of customary international law is being reinvented.
VII. CONCLUSION
Determining the scope of the human rights catalog for online activities
is recognized as the biggest challenge that the information society will have
96. See supra Part II.
97. See, e.g., Sophie Curtis, New Privacy Laws Could Boost EU Cloud Industry,
TECHWORLD, http://news.techworld.com/data-centre/3333104/new-privacy-laws-could-boost-
eu-cloud-industry/ (last visited Aug. 6, 2012).
98. The term refers to the multi-stakeholder nature of Internet governance - it is all the
stakeholders: the governments, the companies, and the users that must find a satisfactory
compromise. See, e.g., Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, WORLD SUMMIT ON THE
INFO. Soc'y, 1 35, http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6revl.html (last visited Aug. 6,
2012).
99. See GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE (Aug. 2, 2012),
http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/.
100. Inaugural Report 2010, GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE (July 26, 2012),
http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/files/GNIAnnualReport_201 O.pdf.
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to face in the near future. Success will be realized only if the global commu-
nity unites to tackle the challenge together. Physical elements of the global
network, regardless of their location, may function well only if they are
managed coherently. If states fail to see that truth and construct firewalls
around the areas that they believe to be their "parts" of the cyberspace,
thereby creating "walled gardens" to protect their residents' privacy, the
global information society will surely face its doom: the end of the global
cloud facilitating the free exchange of thought and information. A consen-
sus-based global solution, resembling BCRs in flexibility, may serve as a
starting point for finding a global consensus on human rights online protec-
tion.

